PRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
EDWARD

F. MCCLENNEN

[T]he object of man's desire is not to enjoy once only and for one instant of time, but to assure forever the way of his future desires. And
therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men tend not only
to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life.'

INTRODUCTION

A great deal of historical and contemporary work in the economic

theory of institutions has focused on what the representative person
can expect in the way of economic benefits by participating in various
institutional arrangements. Starting with Adam Smith, and running
like a bright thread throughout virtually all the subsequent theoretical
literature on political economy, one can mark a preoccupation with
the conditions under which individuals can transact with one another
to their mutual expected economic gain. In the more formal literature on welfare economics, this concern culminates, in the middle of
the twentieth century, in a fundamental theorem, according to which
individuals can, under conditions of perfect competition, achieve an
outcome that is Pareto-optimal and Pareto-efficient relative to the
outcome in which no transactions take place . The theme of Paretoefficient changes in institutional structures is also central to many
other contemporary works, including Coase's analysis of the firm and

t Centennial Professor of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London
School of Economics.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. xi, para. I (A.P. Martinich ed., Broadview
Press
2002) (1651).
2 Of special historical note here are the discussions
in JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. ix, paras. 25-50 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., MacMillan
Pub. Co. 1952) (1690), of the advantages of a system of property, Hume's discussion of
justice in 2 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. III, pt. II, §§ i-iv (T.H.
Green & T.H. Grose eds., Longmans, Green & Co. 1890) (1739), and Smith's argument for markets in ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (James E. Thorold Rogers ed., Clarendon Press 1880) (1776).
3 Formal presentations of these results are to be
found in, for example, K.J.
ARRow & F.H. HAHN, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS (1971); G. DEBREU, THEORY OF
VALUE (1959).
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the problem of social cost,4 Posner's economic analysis of law,5 Axelrod's work on iterated prisoner's dilemma games, 6 Ullmann-Margalit's
study of the emergence of norms,7 and the whole of the public choice
literature of the last four decades." The Pareto conditions also figure
centrally in virtually all axiomatic bargaining and social choice models., In all of this work, the explicit or implicit claim is that rational
individuals, when confronted with the possibilities for mutual (expected) economic gain, will be disposed to take the steps necessary to
secure such gains.
People typically are concerned, however, not just to maximize expected economic gains, but also to protect themselves against losses
that would compromise their prospects for future gains. In the language of Hobbes, as quoted above, they are interested not only in procuring but also in assuring0" The latter theme reappears repeatedly in
the history of political theory," and especially in the literature dealing
with constitutional restraints on the exercise of both legislative and
executive power.12

4 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm,

4 ECONOMIcA 386 (1937); R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. I (1960).
5 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICANALYSIS OF LAW
(3d. ed. 1986).
6 ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
(1984).
7 EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE
OF NORMS (1978).

For a recent overview and extensive bibliography on the public
choice tradition,
see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE Il (2003).
9 Such bargaining models are detailed in R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD
RAIFFA,
GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY 114-54 (1957); ALVIN E.
ROTH, GAME THEORETIC MODELS OF BARGAINING (1985). The social choice models
are the focus of attention in KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL
VALUES (1951); AMARIYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970).
10 This theme is struck not only in the quotation given above from Hobbes's Leviathan, but in his remark that the "passions that incline men to peace are fear of death,
desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them." HOBBES, supra note 1, at ch. xiii, para. 14.
II In early Enlightenment discussions, it is
reflected, among other places, in
Locke's discussion of the right of rebellion against tyrranical acts of the government, a
right that does not receive recognition in Hobbes's Leviathan. Compare LOCKE, supra
note 2, at chs. xvii-xix (considering the extent of the right to oppose "unjust and unlawful force"), with HOBBES, supra note 1, at ch. xviii, para. 3 ("[T]hat they are subjects
to a monarch [means that they] cannot without his leave cast off monarchyand return
to the confusion of a disunited multitude .... ").
12 The relevant literature in legal theory here is, of course, vast. David Richards
provides a useful survey of this perspective within the context of U.S. constitutional
theory and interpretation.
DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 18-130 (1989). James Buchanan has argued the case for the importance of constitutional constraints. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY:
BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN (1975). Surprisingly, however, few contemporary
8
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philosophers have ventured very far into this area. Two very notable exceptions are
DAVID WIGGINS, Claims of Need, in NEEDS, VALUES, TRUTH 1 (Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed.
1998) (1987); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 283 (1981). Dworkin's remarks about prudential considerations occur in
the context of an exceedingly careful but very complex discussion of the issue of equality of resources. Id. at 292-304. In the development of his main thesis regarding equality of resources, Dworkin utilizes the idea of a model world in which all start out with
equal resources (in the form of an equal number of clamshells) which can be used to
bid, in a grand auction, for various goods and services that the participants desire.
Among other goods that are available in this way are insurance policies, which insure
against various kinds of "bad" luck. If (1) one could assume that everyone had an
equal risk of suffering some catastrophe, (2) at the time of the auction, no one yet
knew what catastrophes would befall them, and, finally, (3) persons had different attitudes toward risk-some being more risk prone and others less-then one might think
it fair to let losses fall where they may, and not redistribute resources after the fact so as
to compensate those who suffer catastrophes. Id. That is, the idea would be that individUals are to make their own decisions as to just how much insurance they will purchase. In an interesting move, however, Dworkin argues that (2) obviously fails to hold
in any real world. That is, "[s]ome people are born with handicaps, or develop them
before they have either sufficient knowledge or funds to insure on their own behalf."
Id. at 297. This leads Dworkin to propose the idea of a "hypothetical" insurance market, in which one seeks to determine how much insurance coverage the "average"
member of the community would purchase, and then compensates those who suffer
disasters out of "some fund collected by taxation or other compulsory processes but
designed to match the fund that would have been provided through premiums if the
odds had been equal." Id. at 298. The argument is further elaborated-to deal with
the fact that (1) is also not the case, that all do not really face equal risks, and that one
might want to move beyond the idea of setting the public compensation in terms of
the private compensation provided by the amount of insurance the average person
would purchase, but the net effect is an argument for supplementing "private" auctions (the market) with a public insurance scheme. Id. at 300-09. Dworkin's whole
approach, moreover, essentially rests on a tacit appeal to "common intuitions" rather
than considerations of rational choice. Such an appeal constitutes what R.M. Hare
characterizes as a Cartesian approach, in which one tries to deduce particular rights
and duties from self-evident first principles of morality. See R.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE
OF MORALS 32-44 (1952) (providing a convincing critique of the appeal to self-evident
truths in the case of moral principles). The approach is first subjected to withering
criticism in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, as part of his rejection of
the Thomist view of the status of "practical" principles. See JOHN LOCKE, I AN ESSAY
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING ch. iii. Wiggins's explorations are occasioned
by the following remark, taken from an article by H.L.A. Hart:
A concept of legal rights limited to those cases where the law.., respects the
choice of individuals would be too narrow. For there is a form of the moral
criticism of law which ... is inspired by regard for the needs of individuals for
certain fundamental freedoms and protections or benefits.
H.L.A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, in 2 OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 171, 200
(A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973). The substantive position that Wiggins articulates is very
close, I think, to the one that I try to develop here. We differ principally in regard to
how such a view is to be defended. In particular, Wiggins rejects the idea of grounding
rights in purely prudential or rational considerations. WIGGINS, supra, at 35-37. In
place of this, Wiggins appeals to what he presumably takes to be "common intuitions,"
an appeal that, once again, following Locke and Hare, I find most unsatisfactory. The
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These two concerns, regarding economic gain and protection
against loss, each play a role in James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock's landmark work, The Calculus of Consent.'" Considerations of protection against losses favor the adoption of a unanimity rule in which
each individual's consent must be given to reach a collective decision,
since under such a rule you can veto any policy that would impose
losses on you. Buchanan and Tullock argue, however, that operating
under an unanimity rule is very costly, not only in terms of the time
and other resources that must be expended to secure a full consensus,
but in terms of opportunity costs." ' Many valuable projects will not be
ratified and implemented because of the refusal of some to give their
assent. If these decision-making costs are sufficiently high, one will
find it in one's interest to support less-than-unanimity voting rules.
The significant savings in decision-making and opportunity costsand hence resultant economic gains-will justify exposing oneself to
the risk of policies that can impose losses upon oneself. Indeed, in certain cases, the most cost-effective approach will be to allow decisions
to be made by a simple majority vote, or even to be settled by an administrative decision.' 5

other major difference is that Wiggins, while recognizing the place of "publicly provided systems of education, legal aid and basic health care," id. at 36, gives priority of
place to rights "securing individuals from arbitrary arrest, imprisonment or punishment, and assuring them of other civic and legal protections," as well as the "right to
make certain sorts of agreement with other individuals, to buy the necessities of life,
sell the product of one's labour, and be not dispossessed of that which one has appropriated or mixed one's labour with in ways seen as worthy of being accorded legil recognition." Id. at 34. The priority claim is, however, merely asserted and not defended.
13 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
14 See id. at 63-84 (recognizing that costs
depend on the decisions to be made and
analyzing those costs).
15 Their key argument here, it should be noted,
explicitly invokes the concept of
uncertainty:
Essential to the analysis is the presumption that the individual is uncertain as to
what his own precise role will be in any one of a whole chain of later'collective
choices that will actually have to be made. For this reason he is considered
not to have a particular and distinguishable interest separate and apart from
his fellows. This is not to suggest that he will act contrary to his own interests;
but the individual will not find it advantageous to vote for rules that may promote sectional, class, or group interests because, by presupposition, he is unable to predict the role that he will be playing in the actual collective decision-making process at any particular time in the future. He cannot predict
with any degree of certainty whether he is more likely to be in a winning or a
losing coalition on any specific issue. Therefore, he will assume that occasionally he will be in one group and occasionally in the other. His own
self-interest will lead him to choose rules that will maximize the utility of an
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Buchanan and Tullock go on to argue, however, that it is also rational for individuals to insist on a constitution that specifies different
decision-making rules for different classes of policy matters." The rational individual may well be willing to support a simple majoritarian
rule (or even administrative choices) for cases in which substantial issues are not at stake, but insist on something more approximating a
rule of unanimity for cases where the costs of an adverse decision
could turn out to be prohibitively high. In that latter category, they
suggest, will be policy decisions that modify or restrict the structure of
individual human and property rights.
The relevant point is that the individual will foresee that collective action
in this area may possibly impose very severe costs on him. In such cases
he will tend to place a high value on the attainment of his consent, and
he may be quite willing to undergo substantial decision-making costs in
7
order to 1insure
that he will, in fact, be reasonably protected against confiscation.

The argument for majoritarian procedures and administrative
choices pivots, then, on considerations of the expected savings from
what would be the high decision costs associated with the unanimity
rule. But the argument for constitutional restrictions, for a "bill of
rights," pivots on a different consideration altogether-on the concern of how to avoid substantial losses that could flow from allowing
the majority (or governmental administrators) to settle all issues.
While discussion of the reduction of costs argument spans virtually
the whole of The Calculus of Consent, the argument for protection
against substantial losses receives only a few paragraphs of attention.
In what is to follow, I shall try to redress this imbalance by exploring
individual in a series of collective decisions with his own preferences on the
separate issues being more or less randomly distributed.
Id. at 78. It is also important to note that the degree of uncertainty invoked here is
considerably less than that invoked byJohn Rawls in his famous "behind the veil of ignorance" argument. SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORYOFJUSTICE 17-22 (1971) (discussing a
theory of justice as an alternative to utilitarianism). In Rawls's construction, participants must make a decision about principles under conditions of radicaluncertainty, in
which they know nothing about the position into which they were born in society and
what talents and abilities they have; indeed, they are even denied knowledge of their
own conceptions of the good, of what is ultimately valuable. Id. Moreover, their uncertainties about all these things are so great as to make it inappropriate to assign
probabilities to various possibilities. For Buchanan and Tullock, on the contrary, participants face only ordinary uncertainties about the future, and, as the above quote
makes clear, it is appropriate for them to think in terms of there being a uniform
probability distribution over the relevant space of possibilities.
16 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note
13, at 81.
17

Id. at 73-74.
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the protection argument at length. I also want to extend Buchanan
and Tullock's brief argument in two respects: First, by way of offering
a grounding for their important insight, I shall argue that the concern
to protect against losses that would impair the continued pursuit of
one's ongoing and future interests is a matter of prudence' and, as
such, is something that can plausibly be viewed as a rational concern,
at least for most persons. Second, I shall argue that the objects of
such a prudential concern appropriately include not just the kinds of
protections enumerated, for example, in the U.S. Bill of Rights,' 9 but
other rights as well, including welfare, health, legal representation,
and educational rights. That is, I shall argue that prudential considerations provide a powerful argument not only for constitutional restrictions on governmental actions, but constitutionally mandated,
positive government programs as well. On this way of thinking, a wide
spectrum of public programs can be best understood as efficient ways
in which persons can be provided with insurance against the vicissitudes of both social and commercial activities as well as natural events.
Within the context of a theory of prudential concerns, then, the view
that government is best when it governs least is very questionable.
I. CHARACTERIZING PRUDENTIAL MOTIVATION

To be prudent is clearly something distinct from, say, simply to
have concern for long-term as opposed to short-term considerations.
One who focuses on long-term investments, but chooses among alternatives simply by reference to expected monetary return, is not
thereby being prudent. The plan that yields the greatest expected
monetary return might expose one to substantial risk, including loss
of all of one's capital. To choose in this manner is not to choose prudently. Being prudent involves giving special consideration to the
avoidance of at least certain kinds of loss, even if the loss in question is
quite unlikely.

18

The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines prudence as "the ability to discern

the most suitable, politic, or profitable course of action, esp. as regards conduct; practical wisdom, discretion." OXFORD ENGLIsH DICTIONARY 728 (2d ed. 1989). But other
definitions, see, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 601 (2d ed. 1979), include
the idea of"careful management." This latter sense is the one in which I am interested.
The wide and somewhat erratic range of connotations for the term renders the history
of the concept not very helpful for my purposes. Suffice it to say that what I shall call
"prudence" is clearly one of the things that was traditionally associated with this term.
19 U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
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Being concerned with avoiding loss, however, still does not capture precisely enough the idea of prudence. If one had a steady and
guaranteed source of income, one that was more than sufficient for
the promotion of one's projects-so that what is lost is easily replaceable-avoiding loss would hardly be dictated by prudence. Prudence
is a more focused concern than just avoiding loss, even substantial
loss. It is better characterized as a concern about avoiding a loss that
would be disastrous for the individual in question-and that involves
great harm or damage to that person. This usually includes loss of
life, serious impairment of health, loss of income, and substantial loss
of property. In very general terms, it is concern to avoid a loss that
would prove ruinous to substantial and important undertakings.20
Since disaster is often relative to specific projects that can vary significantly from one person to the next, it might seem hard to draw any
general conclusions about what prudence specifically requires. But
the references to loss of life and impairment of health make it clear
that there are some important general conclusions that can be drawn.
While projects will vary from one person to the next, it is plausible
that each will still be disposed to avoid substantial losses with regard to
what have come to be known as "primary goods." 2 ' These are goods
that are typically useful regardless of one's plan of life or particular
undertakings. 2 They include one's physical, emotional, and intellectual capabilities or skills; financial and other (renewable or nonconsumable) resources; and opportunities-all of which play a critical
role in the pursuit of one's projects.
Primary goods are instrumental goods, but they have a special
place in a system of instrumental value. The value of an instrumental
good is often taken to be entirely derivative of, and dependent upon,
the value of that to which it is a means. From this perspective, usefulness is an ephemeral value, likely to disappear when one's interest in

The OED defines disaster as "anything that befalls of ruinous or distressing
nature; a sudden or great misfortune, mishap, or misadventure; a calamity." OXFORD
ENGLIsri DICTIONARY, supra note 18, at 723.
21 John Rawls introduced the term. RAWLS, supra note 15,
at 62. He divided such
goods into two groups, social and natural. Social primary goods include rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and self-respect. Natural primary
goods include health and vigor, intelligence, and imagination. Id. at 53-54.
22 As Rawls puts the idea in A Theory offJustice,
"with more of these, men can generally be assured of greater success in carrying out their intentions and advancing their
ends." Id. at 92.
20
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the end to be served thereby is altered.23 But primary goods have a
value that tends to be conserved in the face of such changing interests, for they are instrumental to a significantly wide range of projects
that persons might pursue. Correspondingly, the loss of such a good
can compromise many goals or ends that a given person has or might
have in the future.
One can think of a primary good as having, then, a focal value, by
virtue of its having a special instrumental place at the intersection of
many goals and projects. The focal significance of such goods is even
more pronounced within the context of ongoing, longer-range activities. In this case, the securing of such a good can become critical to
the success of whole sequences or chains of actions, spreading from
the present into the distant future. In the language familiar to those
engaged in commercial and productive activities, the temporal span of
plans creates a problem of scheduling. Failure to provide for projects
to be undertaken tomorrow can deeply compromise those future projects. So one's task is perpetually to plan today for what will be
needed tomorrow.
This is the case even if one is completely certain, at each point in
time, as to how the success or failure of future activities will be affected by one's own activities and various background events. But the
temporal span and problem of scheduling it poses takes on a special
significance by virtue of the uncertainty that typically attends such
planning. Such uncertainty arises at two different levels: First, one
has to make plans and begin projects with very imperfect information
about the likelihood of events that can radically affect success or failure. Second, one cannot be sure,, at any given moment, what one's
goals and interests will be in the (more distant) future. In the face of
such uncertainties, a focus on primary goods is to be expected, since
these are goods that are important to secure and conserve regardless
of what the future brings. For all these reasons, the value of a primary
good tends to remain stable even against the background of changing
conditions, interests, and projects, and hence even against changing
views of what is intrinsically valuable.

23 For instance, the possession of a set of excellent knives is of extraordinary value
to a dedicated chef, but not of much value to one whose lifestyle involves eating out
most of the time.
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A. Risks Involving the Loss of Primary Goods
In what is to follow, I shall concentrate on substantial losses that
pertain to such special, all-purpose goods. Whatever other goods are
also the objects of prudential concern, the substantial loss of primary
goods will compromise or impair one's ability to pursue continuing or
anticipated projects, and this is a matter of prudential concern. It is
commonplace, of course, that a rational approach to deliberation involves being prepared to look at net gains and losses. As the argument
for less-than-unanimity rules suggests, one can often treat losses as tolerable if they are balanced out against sufficient gains (e.g., cost reductions). But there are special considerations that arise regarding
deliberation in contexts in which one could experience a substantial
loss of some primary good. Since it is the carrier of focal value, its loss
24
is something that affects a whole range of one's interests.
This
means that one will typically have an aversion to its loss that can only
be allayed, if at all, by a promise of a significant compensating gain of
other goods. Other things being equal, aversion to the loss of primary
goods, then, leads to a disposition to conserve them-to assure oneself a steady supply of resources with which to pursue notjust present,
but future projects as well. Alternatively put, persons will be more
likely to invest resources to protect themselves against such losses.
Such an investment can take the form of avoiding dangerous situations, of entering into cooperative relations with others to prevent or
reduce the adverse impact of such situations, or of purchasing insurance that will compensate for such unavoidable damages. And such
an investment tends to be a feature of what the representative individual regards as a rational approach to planning.5
24

Employing the framework used in DAVID BRAYBROOKE, MEETING NEEDS 29-32

(1987), we can describe such concerns as focusing on "course-of-life" needs as distinguished from adventitious needs, which relate to very specific projects, such as the
need for a spinnaker if one is to be competitive in a sailboat race.
25 This is not to say that the deliberation of a rational individual focuses
only on
the conservation of primary goods. Any good to which one attaches great intrinsic
value, particularly one that is irreplaceable, is something that one will be disposed to
conserve. Again, if a person's whole life were bound up with a specific, overriding project-say the completion of a major bibliography-a considerable focus of one's prudential concern specifically will be the preservation of the entries one has already
complied, and this may call for very specific investments, e.g., back-up discs stored in
fireproof containers, of a sort that might well have little value with respect to any other
project one might pursue. But for most persons prudential concerns will, in a wide
range of situations, tend to focus on all-purpose goods-on resources that characteristically can and will be put to alternative uses.

926

UNIVERSITY OF PNNS YL VANIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 151: 917

B. Prudence and Rationality
Is prudence mandated by rationality? Clearly, there are life projects that require one to expose oneself to great risks. Those who
dedicate themselves to furthering some grand ideal may be fully and
appropriately prepared to sacrifice themselves, their health, and their
personal well-being, for the sake of that ideal. At the other end of the
spectrum, it is possible to imagine persons whose self-consciouslychosen lifestyle involves paying little or no attention to assuring the
satisfaction of future desires; they simply prefer living by their wits,
moment to moment, with little concern for the future. It would be a
mistake, then, to simply incorporate the idea of prudence into that of
rationality. We can accept the idea that for some individuals certain
prudential concerns will be very attenuated, or perhaps even nonexistent. And in special cases there may not be any rational ground on
which to criticize the person for not having such concerns.
But it is still the case that for the vast majority of persons, with
quite disparate goals and interests, a prudential concern is not simply
just one concern among many that such persons mightjust happen to
have. It is a concern that naturally and unavoidably arises within the
context of ordinary deliberations about organizing activities in pursuit
of one's present and anticipated interests. Other things being equal,
if it is rational to choose to effectively promote our ends, and if we
now have longer-range interests and/or expect to have interests that
we will want to pursue in the future, then it is rational to make provisions to ensure that our ends can be satisfactorily achieved. For most
individuals, then, some measure of concern for prudential considerations will be a feature of rational deliberation.
C. Prudence and Expected Utility Theory
I have suggested above that concerns regarding risk and uncertainty cannot be met by simply choosing to maximize expected monetary or economic return. A high-expected economic return is compatible with risking all of one's resources (including one's life) so long
as the probability of such a loss is sufficiently small. In the face of uncertainties about natural events and the behavior of other participants, prudent persons will likely forego a certain amount of expected
gains in order to protect themselves against the possibility of disastrous losses. By purchasing insurance, for example, one can reduce
significantly the probability of certain losses, but paying the required
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insurance premium will mean that one's expected monetary return is
reduced 6
The standard theory of rational choice is less than fully satisfactory
in the way in which it deals with such prudential concerns. In the
landmark work in the second half of the twentieth century on the
formal representation of preferences through utility functions, The
Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, room is made in principle for
capturing prudential concerns. 27 That is, utility theory allows for risk
and uncertainty aversion (or preference). The way this is done is
rather complicated, however, and quite counterintuitive. Instead of
thinking, as in the case of time discounts, of a fractional discount factor that might vary from one person to the next, it is assumed that all
rational agents discount risky prospects at the same fractional value
that represents the (subjectively or objectively defined) probabilities
of the various gains and losses. Risk aversion or risk seeking is then
quantified by encoding it in the marginal rates of change in the utility
values of increasing amounts of some nonrisky good. This is expressed by the degree of concavity or convexity of the utility function
for increasing amounts of the particular good in question. 8 Whatever
is gained thereby in terms of an elegant axiomatization of utility, this
method of representing attitudes toward risk has created great conceptual confusion. It seriously conflates two very distinct conceptsthat of attitudes toward risk and that of decreasing (or increasing) marginal rates for increasing amounts of the good in question. It also severely restricts how attitudes toward risk can be incorporated into
29
one's utility function
The story concerning uncertainty, as distinct from risk, is more
complicated. Intuitively, uncertainty involves disjunctively possible
outcomes for which one cannot assign any determinate probability
values. ° In the standard "Bayesian" (or "personalist") construction of
utility and risk, however, uncertainty is quite implausibly and counterintuitively reduced to a form of risk. Under the Bayesian construcSee, e.g., Milton Friedman & Leonard J. Savage, The Utility Analysis
of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 279 (1948) (characterizing the purchase of insurance as "choosing certainty in preference to uncertainty").
Id. (describing degrees of risk in a broad range of economic choices).
28 See, e.g., John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and
in the Large, 32
ECONOMETRICA 122 (1964) (discussing a measure of risk aversion).
29 For an extended discussion of the problems here,
see EDWARD F. MCCLENNEN,
26

RATIONALITY AND DYNAMIC CHOICE: FOUNDATIONAL EXPLORATIONS 44-59 (1990).

30 For the classic statement of this view, see
R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA,
GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY 275-326 (1957).
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tion, it is assumed that a rational agent, who is completely uncertain
about the probabilities to be assigned to each of n mutually exclusive
and exhaustive events, will treat such events as equally likely. That is,
she will assign 1/n to each of the n events." This leaves no room for
the plausible notion that uncertainty can engender special concerns
over and above those of risk, where probabilities are well defined. 2
Leaving that issue aside, however, it is important to note that by reducing uncertainty to risk and permitting different attitudes toward
risk, the Bayesian construction also permits variation in attitude toward uncertainty from one person to the next.
II. THE OBJECTS OF PRUDENTIAL CONCERN

I have already noted that human projects are sufficiently diverse
that there is perhaps nothing the loss of which would compromise any
project that a given person might pursue. If one's ultimate and
overiding project is to set oneself afire and thereby sacrifice one's life
in protest of some injustice done to some group of persons, one's
prudential considerations will be vastly more focused and narrower
than those of the "ordinary" person. Therefore, we will have to settle
for delineating attributes that tend to be indispensable or important
for a significantly wide range of human pursuits.
Another complication is that anything that one might want to
characterize as a proper object of prudential concern could also be
something a given individual regards as intrinsically valuable. It is well
documented that many things that persons initially value simply for
their usefulness end up being treated as having special intrinsic
value.33 This tendency poses a major problem for any inquiry such as
the present, which seeks to ground the value of various institutional
structures in their capacity to promote human interests. Since individuals will find such institutions intrinsically valuable, much of what I
will argue will appear unnecessary, as superfluous, given the individual's own value commitments. I can only hope that readers will still
appreciate that there are some individuals for whom these institutional structures are more problematic, and that my arguments re31

Id. at 286-98; see also LEONARD]. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTIcS 45

(2d rev. ed. 1972) (presenting Bayes's rule).
"2The opening shot, and in many respects still the most compelling presentation
of the case against this way of thinking about uncertainty, is found in Daniel Ellsberg,
Risk, Ambiguity and the SavageAxionms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643 (1961).
33 One of the most insightful treatments of this phenomenon
is found in WILLIAM
H. GASS, FICTION AND TIE FIGURES OF LIFE 191 (1971).

20031

PRUDENCE
03]
AND CONS77TIUTIONAL RIGHTS

garding the usefulness of those structures may have significant leverage with them.
One must also recognize that responding to a particular prudential concern will typically involve making a commitment to a variety of
different policies. For example, if one is deeply concerned with maintaining one's bodily integrity and health, one will be concerned not
only with protecting oneself from various diseases, but also from
criminal attacks by others, from drunk drivers, from a wide variety of
natural disasters such as storms and floods, and from the actions of
overzealous public prosecutors and police officers. As we shall see
shortly, the story to be told here is complicated.
Against the background of these rather general observations,
there are a number of ways in which one might classify prudential
concerns relating to primary goods. The approach I shall use is to divide them into four categories: bodily integrity, mental and emotional
integrity, various kinds of resources, and opportunities.
A. Bodily Integrity
For most undertakings, maintenance of one's physical existence as
a living, functioning organism is essential.34 Under the general heading of bodily integrity one can include not just the integrity of the
body (such as maintenance of life, limb, and health), but also maintenance of natural and acquired physical skills, attributes, and abilities.
This means, among other things, that one will not only be concerned
with protection against physical damage to the body, but also with the
provision of adequate food, water, clothing, shelter, exercise, and rest.
B. Mental and Emotional Integrity
The question of what it means to function well at this level is subject to somewhat more debate, but viewed from the perspective of a
theory of primary goods, one's ability to function well both mentally
and emotionally is essential to virtually any undertaking. Functioning
well at this level involves the development of various mental and emotional skills, including being able to deliberate and reason well, and
being able to be "in control of," rather than being driven by, one's

34 Typically, but not invariably, loss of life, limb, and
health will deeply compromise one's undertakings regardless of what they are. But if one's objective is to make a
martyr of oneself, sacrificing one's life will be an essential part of what one plans to
accomplish.
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emotions. A plausible case can be made, however, that this also involves assurances of some of the classical "freedoms" cited in the U.S.
Bill of Rights: freedom of thought and conscience; 35 protection
against arbitrary interference with one's privacy, family, home, and
correspondence;"' and freedom from harassment and continual
threats.37 In addition, one can argue that this category also includes:
protection of one's honor and reputation; access to familial and love
relations; friendships, cultural and religious ties; and maintenance of
conditions under which one can achieve self-respect, including mean381
ingful work, acceptance, and recognition by others.

35 See U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. "); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 591-92 (1992) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits "(a] state-created
orthodoxy [that] puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience"); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("[T]he right of freedom of thought [is] protected
by the First Amendment.").
See U.S. CONSr. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated ..
"); U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."); U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.");
see also California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 646 n.18 (1991) ("The purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is "'to prevent arbitrary... interference by [law] enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.""' (quoting INS v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210, 215 (1983) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554
(1975)))); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-24 (1989) (holding that substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment protects some parental and family
rights); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408-10 (1976) (referring to prior Supreme Court cases that protect private papers in some circumstances under the Fifth
Amendment). But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976) (holding that injury to
a person's honor or reputation by itself is not a "liberty" interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
47 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall
be ... subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... ); see also Arizona v. Washington, 434
U.S. 497, 508 (1977) (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1975) (quoting
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963)), in order to show that the Double
Jeopardy Clause protects individuals from the ""'harassment... [of] successive prosecutions""' for the same crime).
38 The inclusion of conditions necessary for self-respect
is argued for in RAWLS,
supra note 15, at 440-46. But many of these same conditions are also singled out in the
U.N. Universal Declaration of Hunan Rights. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). In particular, see the provisions concerning nationality (Article 15), marriage (Article 16), personal dignity (Article 22), education
(Article 26), and participation in cultural life (Article 27).
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C. All-Purpose Resources
A third category deals with various abilities and other attributes of
the person, as well as external goods that have a general, all-purpose
usefulness. One can mention here, in particular, skills that enable an
individual to function as an independent person, communicate with
others (which requires a basic mastery of a language), deal with a wide
range of social situations, and engage in some form of productive
work. Developing these resources requires, in turn, that the individual acquire a basic education and training. Among important external goods are reliable information, income, and other exchangeable
goods.
D. Opportunities
The promotion of projects requires not only resources but opportunities as well. Without access to opportunities, resources cannot be
put to use. These opportunities include personal freedom, freedom
of movement from one locale to another, and, at the very least, legal
rights of access to the more advantaged positions in society. Moreover, with respect to those opportunities that can only be realized by
concerted action, one needs access to various kinds of cooperative relations with other persons. Typically, this category includes freedom
of participation in political activities.
III. A CLASSIFICATION

OF SOURCES OF RISK

If the avoidance of substantial losses of various primary goods distinguished above is a matter of concern for the representative individual, we need also to identify the sources of risks that might threaten
these losses. In very general terms, one can distinguish two basic
sources: natural events and the actions of persons.
A. NaturalEvents
Natural events are one obvious source of risk. These include a
wide range of adverse weather conditions, including storms, extreme
heat or cold, earthquakes, droughts and floods, and fires. In addition,
one can mention infestations of insects, plants, and other animals; attacks by predatory animals; and contagious and genetically based diseases.
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B. The Actions of Persons
The risk to an individual may stem from the private acts of other
members of one's own society, or from the private acts of persons outside of one's own society ("foreigners"). It may also stem from the organized or authorized acts of persons who are charged with maintaining order and administrating the prevailing rules-that is, from
actions of domestic or foreign public officials of one sort or another
(legislative,judicial, or executive). Finally, one must also include oneself as a source of risk, since one's own actions can expose one to serious harm.
IV. THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK

Given the various types and sources of risk, how is any particular
type of risk to be managed? In order to address this explicitly normative issue, a number of crosscutting considerations need to be explored: First, there are issues still to be addressed regarding how considerations of prudence are to be factored into rational deliberation.
Second, there is the question of whether it is appropriate to let the
matter of dealing with risk lie with the individual, or whether, at least
for certain forms of risk, cooperative action is needed. Closely connected to this is a third question: whether the degree of risk to which
the person is exposed is something that can be voluntarily controlled
by the individual, or whether the risk in question is one to which the
individual is involuntarily exposed. Finally, with respect to the risk
that can only be managed by collective action, there is the question of
whether social, commercial, or public institutions offer the most appropriate means to manage the risk.
A. FactoringPrudentialConcerns into Deliberation
Here we face a number of significant complications. As I argued
in Part I.B, it is unclear that rational persons must take prudential
considerations into account. Even if the nature of their interests
makes it rational to do so, this does not settle the issue of what is a rational (or even reasonable) level of concern, that is, what constitutes a
"rational" or reasonable balancing of prudential concerns against the
concern to choose so as to maximize expected return. Moreover, allowances must be made for the fact that individuals differ in the relative emphasis that they place on the importance of the various primary goods or resources delineated above in Part II. If individuals can
reasonably differ about how much weight should be placed on pru-
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dence, and which are the more important objects of prudential concern, how, then, are we to resolve these differences within the public
arena? Let me defer these questions, however, as there are other matters that we need to consider-matters whose consideration may help
to clarify these normative issues.
B. Personal Controlof the Level of Risk to Which One Is Exposed
One key to understanding how prudential concerns can be dealt
with appropriately is to consider the extent to which the representative individual can control the level of risk to which she is exposed. In
most societies there is a significantly large area within which persons
can make their own decisions regarding the amount of risk to which
they are willing to be exposed. Those who want to surf, hang glide,
explore caves, or climb cliffs can do so, and those who find these activities too risky can refrain. Similarly, individuals can typically select a
profession that is consistent with their concerns about risk. Some
people will be willing to expose themselves to the dangers associated
with being a police officer, or working with hazardous materials, while
others will choose safer professions." In the social and economic
spheres, a right to refuse to join, and a corresponding right to exit,
can provide a certain measure of protection. If the social or economic
arrangement exposes an individual to an unacceptable level of risk,
she can refuse4 to enter the group, or choose to exit if she is already
participating. 0 Similarly, the principle of prohibiting the transference
of property without consent can provide persons with protection

This does not mean that there is no need to regulate the extent and nature of
risks to which individuals are exposed in such professions. When persons expose
themselves to certain risks and become injured, there can be significant negative spillover effects for others, which may lead to the public regulation of the activity in question. For example, persons who are improperly trained in mountain climbing or boating can get into difficulty and have to be rescued at great expense to the public. There
are also important questions that must be raised about how freely certain professions
are chosen. For example, a person who grows up in a mining town and has extensive
social and family relations that are important to her may have little choice but to accept employment in the mine. Similar questions can be (and have been) raised about
the concept of a voluntarily based military service, since many disadvantaged young
adults may have few alternatives to entering military service. See Charles C. Moskos,
Making the All-Volunteer Framework: A National Service Approach, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 17, 20
(1981) (noting that the all-volunteer military recruits consist of "large numbers of
youth ... who halve] no real alternative job prospects").
40 The implications of having the option of exit are discussed at length in ALBERT
39
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against an important class of risks, by allowing them to be the judge of
whether or not there is too much risk involved in some proposed
transaction. 4'
In virtually any society, however, individuals are subject to certain
risks over which they have little or no control. For example, the
authorized actions of public officials impose a wide range of obligations on persons that do not flow from voluntary choices on their part,
and failure to meet these obligations typically carries with it negative
sanctions, and, more generally, the imposition of liabilities, financial
and otherwise. This is the case regardless of the method of collective
choice-whether the public choice procedure involves a relatively
autocratic command and control structure or more democratic processes. Even in the case of the most democratic of processes, the collective choice upon which the society settles will typically be one that
some individuals do not support, precisely because it imposes costs
upon them.
Beyond publicly authorized actions, the social and economic (as
distinct from political) actions of other individuals or groups of individuals can impose risks on any given individual. One's control here,
especially in the marketplace, is most imperfect. Any given person's
livelihood and health can be adversely affected by the publicly allowable acts of others. Individuals or groups of individuals may undertake social and/or economic activities that are either intentionally or
unintentionally disadvantageous to some other person. Thus, one's
property value can be reduced by a decision on the part of a neighbor
as to how her property will be used. Alternatively, the neighbor may
sell her property to someone who wants to use it for commercial purposes, and this can impact negatively on other property owners in the
area.43 Sometimes the impact of the permissible actions of others is
41 In contrast, the market principle allowing
for transference by mutual consent
can be defended on the ground that individuals expect to benefit from such consensual exchanges.
42 By the same token, one person's actions may
directly or indirectly benefit an-

other, and similarly, the coordinated actions of a group of persons may benefit individuals not in the group.
43 Individuals may seek protection against such a change in usage by
adopting zoning regulations. The immediate effect of the zoning restriction may be to lower the
price of one's property, but one may be willing to incur this loss in order to protect
oneself against other commercial buyers moving into the neighborhood. Buchanan
and Tullock cite a somewhat different zoning requirement as an example of a desirable protection, namely, the requirement that a variance in an existing zoning ordinance receive near-unanimous consent of those whose property will be impacted
upon. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 13, at 74.
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much more indirect. Thus, for example, technological developments
may place persons in a position where they have to expose themselves
to certain risks whether they want such exposure or not, such as when
persons have to use various forms of public or commercial transportation in order to pursue a livelihood.
In what is to follow, I shall assume that the appropriate focus of
our attention should be on what constitutes a rational way to manage
risks over which one cannot exercise personal control or where the
exercise of such control would be very costly to the individual (e.g., by
refusing to expose oneself to the risks involved in travel by commercial airlines or trains). To the extent that risks can be controlled by
the voluntary choices that persons make as individuals, and where the
exercise of such control does not require a significant sacrifice of
other values, it is plausible to suppose that risk management is appropriately left up to the individual.
C. Risks that Require Collective Management
While some risks can be reduced by private choices, there are
many risks that require, for their management, cooperative action by a
number of people. A system of internal order, which provides each
with security with regard to person and property, requires private
and/or public organizations that are committed to maintaining such
an internal order. Typically this means assigning certain persons specialized roles in which they are charged with monitoring the actions of
others, and with apprehending, punishing, and exacting compensation from those who violate the rights of others. Similarly, protection
against foreign threats requires the creation of elaborate and expensive armed forces. Dealing with threats from nature also typically requires coordination of action. Certain kinds of natural catastrophes
can only be prevented or reduced in their severity by large-scale, concerted actions (such as the building of dikes and dams). In addition,
prudence calls, at the very least, for various kinds of disaster relief
programs, so that citizens may be provided with help in the case of
unavoidable natural disasters. The risks of infection and disease similarly require health organizations that can both control the spread of
diseases and provide persons with treatment for their individual
health problems, whether those have arisen from the acts of others or
of nature. Finally, bodily integrity can only be sustained if one has access to certain basic necessities-food and water, clothing, shelter, exercise and rest, and effective and safe ways to dispose of bodily
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wastes-which individuals may be unable to supply for themselves,
due to the actions of others or nature.
D. Alternative Methodsfor the Collective Provision of Protection
Consider now the class of risks whose management requires concerted cooperative action. What approaches can be taken to the collective management of such risks? If one distinguishes between governmental arrangements that involve constitutional provisions and
those that are authorized by persons occupying legislative and executive roles, then one can mark, in summary, four general ways of collectively managing risk: socially, commercially, legislatively, and constitutionally.
Many forms of protection have traditionally been provided by social, as distinct from commercial and governmental, arrangements.
Historically, private, consensual, customary, and philanthropic arrangements between private individuals have accounted for an enormous amount of what we think of as basic protection for persons
against the vicissitudes of the marketplace, of political processes, and
of natural forces.
There is, in addition, a whole range of concerns that can be, and
have historically been, dealt with by commercial arrangements, by having concerned individuals pay commercial firms to provide protection
against various forms of risk. Thus, for example, individuals can purchase insurance against certain kinds of eventualities, including not
only natural forces, but also the actions of others. But individuals may
choose to resort to commercial services that prevent, rather than simply compensate for, various kinds of losses. Thus, for example, individuals who live in a certain area may choose to hire additional security guards who will be able to offer a higher level of protection
against crimes, such as theft, than the protection that may be provided
publicly.
Governments have traditionally managed some risks. The most
obvious example is protection against foreign aggression and domination. But government action is also taken to be central to protecting
against, and providing compensation for, the illegal actions of one's
fellow citizens.44 And it is also employed in the case of certain projects

Thus even some committed libertarians are prepared to accept that stateorganized protection against the illegal acts of other private individuals is appropriate.
See ROBERT NOZIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 113-18 (1974) (concluding that the
protective association dominant in a territory is a state). Nozick supposes that these
44
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that are designed to offer protection against the destructive forces of
nature.
The public provision of protection itself can take one of two
forms. First, public projects can be initiated by legislative enactments,
the passage of which is determined by (some variant of) a majoritarian rule, and the enforcement of which is typically entrusted to executive officers. Second, protection may come in the form of "constitutional" provisions, which establish entitlements for citizens to
certain basic protections or services. These are sometimes, as in the
case of the U.S. Constitution, set forward in a "bill of rights," which is
an explicit part of the constitutional structure (and subject to revision
only by a heightened majority). Alternatively, they may be incorporated into legal precedent. In either case, the interpretation of such
rights is typically entrusted to a judicial, as distinct from a legislative,
process.
V. THE NORMATIVE ISSUES
The central questions, to which I now want to return, are normative. First, there is the question whether there are rational grounds on
which protections can be cooperatively sought; and second, granting
that at least some forms of essentially involuntary risk require concerted cooperative activity for their rational management, what can be
said about the relative (that is, comparative) advantages of the different ways of managing the risks that were distinguished above?
With respect to the first question, the argument presented in the
proceeding Sections is that the appropriate model for understanding
the rational management of risks is through the kind of prudential
pooling of risks and resources that takes place in insurance and mutual help schemes. 45, This is not to deny that there may be other perspectives that provide reasons for the collective management of riskperspectives that speak to considerations of moral, political, or religservices are originally privately contracted for, but argues that standard economic considerations favor their centralization and professionalization, so that, on his account,
there is a defensible move from private protection organizations to a publicly guaranteed order, i.e., to a minimal state. Id. at 110-13.
45 This theoretical perspective closely matches the conclusions very
recently put
forward, on the basis of an extensive analysis of empirical data, by ROBERT E. GOODIN
ET AL., THE REAL WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1999). Their work is based on
panel data from Germany, The Netherlands, and the United States. On the basis of
that data they argue that the much more extensive government welfare program in
The Netherlands is best understood as an effective way to provide needed insurance
for persons. Id. at 252.
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ious duty. But prudence offers a powerful argument for collectively
managing a wide variety of risks, even if persons differ as to the level
and kind of protection they are concerned to put in place. Let me
now turn, then, to consider what can be said, from a general and
comparative point of view, regarding the alternative ways that were
distinguished above for the collective management of prudential concerns.
A. The Argument for the Minimal State View
Libertarians have sought to defend an extreme thesis regarding
the provision of protections, according to which the state should be
responsible for only certain very specific, and limited kinds of protection (against external threats, internal disorder, and violations of
property rights) and not others. This amounts to an acceptance of
governmental arrangements, but only for a very limited set of concerns.
One familiar line of reasoning in defense of this position is that
individuals have certain "natural rights" concerning their person and
their property, rights that exist prior to any form of government and
which governments must respect. 47 On the typical account, anything
but the most minimal of governments would lead to violations of these
rights. 4 There are, however, two serious objections that can be raised
to this selective appeal to such rights: First, the epistemological basis
for the rights-claims in question is extremely weak. Essentially, proponents of the limited government thesis appeal to what they take to
be self-evident first principles regarding the moral rights that persons
have.49 But the appeal to self-evidency here is merely an appeal to
what the proponent takes to be "intuitively" obvious: ° And such "in-

See NozICK, supra note 44, at 10 ("Individuals in ...[a] state
of nature are in 'a
perfect state of freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions ... as
they see fit."' (quoting LOCKE, supra note 2, at ch. ii, para. iv)).
47 See id. at ix ("Individuals have rights
and there are things no person or group
may do to them (without violating their rights).").
46

48 Id.

See id. at 28-29 (presuming that individual moral rights exist before
a societal
structure is created).
'50
The typical starting point for the libertarian is an appeal to the doctrine
of
natural law as found, for example, in Thomist philosophy. See, e.g., MURRAY N.
ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBER'IY 3-24 (1982) (describing "Thomist Tradition").
But this involves an appeal, once again, to the very Cartesian approach that Locke and
Hare have so convincingly critiqued. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (criticizing the Cartesian approach to deducing self-evident truths). Sometimes the appeal to
49
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tuitions" tend to vary distressingly from one group to another. Those
who appeal to the self-evidency (intuitive certitude) of certain socalled personal and property rights characteristically find themselves
speaking to the circle of those already convinced, with little, if anything, to offer those who view things differently. Second, we are offered no argument as to why these particular rights are held sacred
and not others. Why should we suppose, as advocates of the minimal
thesis insist, that there should be a public guarantee with respect to a
right to the fruits of one's labor, or to whatever property one manages
to acquire, but not to, say, the having of property itself, or to public
help in time of need?
A second, and quite distinct, line of argument for the minimal
state thesis might seem more promising, since it proceeds specifically
from considerations of prudence. The argument is that the kind of
centralized power that is entailed by the public provision of welfare
benefits, insurance, and the like, poses a deep risk to individuals. 1
Such centralization of power exposes persons to the real risk of government domination . There is no question but that this argument
has exerted an enormous influence
on modern debates over the
5
1
government.
of
scope
proper
Once again, however, there are substantial objections that can be
raised against this line of argument. In the first place, little recogni-

the doctrine of natural law or rights is made without even a pretense of a defense of
the principles to which appeal is made. Nozick, for example, appeals to Locke's theory
of natural rights, which provides him, he tells us, with a "moral background" from
which to proceed to make the case for no more than a limited state. See NOZICK, supra
note 44, at 3-9 (asserting that "Locke's state of nature... [is a] completely accurate
statement of the moral background"). Nozick is careful to note that the "completely
accurate statement of the moral background, including the precise statement of the
moral theory and its underlying basis, would require a full-scale presentation and is a
task for another time." Id. at 9. Alas, Nozick did not manage to complete this task.
But he informs us that he takes (minor) comfort in the consideration that he is simply
following in this regard "the respectable tradition of Locke, who does not provide anything remotely resembling a satisfactory explanation of the status and basis of the law
of nature in his Second Treatise." Id. Thus, the whole of Nozick's case for the minimal
state rests on a premise for which no evidence is offered.
51 The classic statement of this view is contained in FRIEDRICH
A. HAYEK, THE
ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). But see FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF
LIBERTY 133-47 (1960) (presenting imuch more nuanced and careful statement of his
thesis).
52 The focus on protection against domination, rather
than protection against interference, is the theme of Philip Pettit's recent work, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF
FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (1997).
53 For an illuminating discussion of this, see GARY WILLS,
A NECESSARY EVIL 297308 (1999).
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tion is given to the consideration that this isjust one of many risks that
are typically the object of prudential concern. With the exception of
committed anarchists, no one argues that the risk of placing power in
the hands of the government councils against government protection
from foreign invasion and private disregard of the rights of others.
But what, then, is the argument that these forms of governmental protection are acceptable while others are not? Second, there are alternative ways in which the problem of the concentration of power can
be addressed-specifically by the introduction of constitutional constraints, a system of checks and balances, and the decentralization of
governmental control.
The third, and perhaps most persuasive, line of argument is that
governmental programs in these various areas prove to be no more
than a second-best way to provide individuals with protection-and
that social and/or commercial arrangements can accomplish the same
thing in an economically more efficient manner. This argument invokes, in effect, considerations of mutually expected gain rather than
prudence.
The history of arguments from considerations of mutually expected gain is, however, quite complicated. In the twentieth century,
in particular, mutual gain has repeatedly been invoked in support of
expanding government programs." The argument is that many of the
goods that persons desire constitute public goods in the technical
sense of that term. That is, the provision of such a good to one citizen
does not necessarily diminish the amount that can be provided to another, and, at least under present and foreseeable technological conditions, when its benefits are provided to some, one cannot exclude
other members of the society from benefiting as well. These, then,
are goods whose supply cannot be targeted to only those persons who
are willing to pay for them. In standard economic analysis, this means
that if it were left to commercial organizations to supply such goods,
they would inevitably be undersupplied. Economists have typically
used this kind of "market failure" argument to defend the public (as
distinct from the commercial) provision of certain goods ' National

54

See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE BASES FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (General

Learning Press 1971).
55 For the details of this sort of argument, see Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organizationof
Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in
JOINT ECON. COMM., 91ST CONG., THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC
EXPENDITURES: THE PPB SYSTEM 47-64 (Comm. Print 1969).
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defense, education, and many other goods are thought to have this
character.5 6
In more recent years, however, defenders of the minimal state
view have used a variant of this argument to resist the expansion of
public programs. They have argued that if market processes tend to
be less than fully efficient (by virtue of "market failure" problems),
public forms of provision are also inefficient in their own way. The
issue is thus which of two imperfect processes is, in the balance, the
least imperfect, and the conclusion is that economic and 5social, as op1
posed to government, programs are better in this respect.
One basic problem with this sort of argument is that even if a
given way of providing security is associated with lower costs (and thus
a higher expected return) than some other approach, this does not
yet speak in favor of that approach. The more costly approach may,
after all, offer more security to the representative person and this, for
one who is prudent, may be a decisive consideration. 8
Whatever support the limited state view can find within the
framework of a theory of prudential choice will have to come from a
much more careful sorting out of the comparative advantages of the
various ways of managing risk: social, commercial, and governmental.
Let me now turn, then, to what can be said in that regard.
B. The Social Provision of Protection
With respect to a wide range of the concerns delineated above,
the historical solution has been for security to be socially supplied. In
most traditional societies, virtually all of these concerns, insofar as
they are met at all, are met locally by social rather than political institutions. What characterizes such societies, however, is that membership in the basic social groups is relatively stable. That is, in traditional societies persons are born into a certain social group, and most

For example, if a group of persons in a neighborhood hire a private security
force to combat theft in the area, all who live in that area benefit, whether or not they
contribute to the costs of maintaining such a security force.
57 A carefully argued version of this line of reasoning is to be found in RICHARD
A.
EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY 71-75 (1998). Epstein embraces the principle
of res petit domino ("losses lie where they fall"), and argues against public risk sharing
and programs, and in favor of some combination of social and commercial forms of
protection. See id. at 74-75 (describing the wisdom of res petit domino in the context of
56

insurance).

See supra Part L.A (discussing why purchasing insurance means accepting a lower
expected return).
58
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of them remain within that group. This means, of course, that insofar
as there are resources available to the social unit, persons in such societies have considerable assurance that their prudential concerns will
be met.
Within the context of modern, market-oriented, adaptive, and
open societies, however, things are very different. Such a society provides the opportunity for greatly increased material well-being.
Growth, however, requires that markets become increasingly open,
and this, in turn, requires mobility of individuals! ' Persons must be
prepared to move out of the local (village) setting if they are to capture the opportunities available in an open society. On the other
hand, the deeply personalized relationships that provide the network
of social support in the village do not so easily transport, and thus are
usually left behind. 0
The kind of mobility required for expanding markets, then, is inconsistent with the social supply of security. The expansion and rationalization of the market process itself generates the need for alternative ways of meeting prudential concerns. That is, the economic
rationalization of relations between persons creates the very conditions under which traditional forms of social security-based on kinship, clan, and village organization of social relations-can no longer
provide the needed protection.6'
C. The Market Provision of Protection
I have already acknowledged that individuals can differ significantly with respect to how much risk they are willing to bear. Given
such variability, the idea of supplying certain forms of security
through the marketplace itself via the purchase of insurance or specialized protection services is extremely attractive. Insurance is typically available in the marketplace to compensate for health problems,
bodily injury, and loss of property. Similarly, one can purchase services that include bodily and property protection, information, and

See Avner Grief, CulturalBeliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and
Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912, 94244 (1994) (concluding from a historical case study that a social system of individual
mobility is more efficient, leading to greater economic growth).
60 The logic of a market society in this regard is expounded in ERNEST GELLNER,
CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY 97-102 (1994).
61 See PARTHA DASGUP[A, AN INQUIRY INTO WELL-BEING
AND DESTITUTION 104
(1993) (arguing that a state committed to economic growth cannot avoid responsibility
for a civil society to substitute for "tribal, or clan, or religious, or ethnic loyalties").
59
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even access to social contacts. Such methods allow persons, in principle, to realize their preferred level of risk bearing.
The standard objection to the commercial supply of many forms
of protection has been, as already indicated, that these goods are public goods that theoretically will be undersupplied by the market. In
the last three decades, this thesis has been subject to a sustained critique.62 One obvious response is that the "market failure" or undersupply problem is essentially a problem with exclusion, i.e., sellers are
unable to effectively exclude nonpurchasers from enjoying benefits.
However, many problems of this sort are really only technical problems that can (and will) be resolved by innovative measures. Moreover, as I noted above,"3 arguments about the market failures can be
countered by arguments regarding government failures.
There is, however, a distinct and much more telling objection to
commercial forms of protection, which is that there is nothing in the
nature of market processes themselves that assures that persons will be
able to purchase the insurance or services they need and desire. It is
money that provides one with access to commercial protection. Thus,
there will be no assurance that all will receive either the needed or desired protection. And this is something about which the prudent person must be concerned. The problem is greatly exacerbated by the
way in which markets work, since private suppliers of insurance are
naturally disposed to seek out those who are less risky, or to charge
more risky persons with a higher premium. Either method leads to
less protection for the less fortunate.
D. The Governmental Supply of Protection
Provisioning in the United States takes the form of public programs such as unemployment insurance, Medicare, AFDC, and welfare support that are generated by whatever political processes are in
effect. In principle, this is supposed to resolve any "market failure"
problems and also fix the problem of uneven coverage associated with
the commercial supply of protection.
Regardless of whether a society's political structure is radically
democratic or highly autocratic, however, it is still the case that the
individual beneficiary has little control over the decision-making proFor the most important contributions to this critique, see the collection
of articles in THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE: A CRITIcAL EXAMINATION (Tyler Cowen ed.,
62

1988).
63
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cess for determining what protections will be publicly provided, and at
what level. This is obvious in the case of autocratic political rule, but
is no less true in a democracy. There is no assurance that one will not
end up being a member of a minority, whose concerns are continually
overridden by a stable majority. Once again, the representative individual lacks any real assurance that protection will be available if supplied by political processes. And this will be a matter of prudential
concern. That a given society has in fact an extensive welfare program
in place does not resolve the prudential concerns of its members. The
question, once again, is what assurancesdo persons have in that society
that such benefits will continue to be provided.
The provided level of support is an especially critical problem.
There is no guarantee that the levels of protection provided by ordinary political processes will meet the concerns of many in such a society. That is, there is no assurance that ordinary political processes,
democratic or autocratic, will provide a higher, rather than a lower,
level of protection. It all depends upon the choices made by thoseindividuals or groups-who hold power in a society.
There is another objection to settling upon lower levels of protection. In any modem society in which there is a significant range of
commercial protection available, when a lower level of protection is
provided by public means, those who are financially capable will still
have the option of supplementing public protection with private arrangements. Under those conditions, basic protections become even
more unevenly distributed.
In summary, there are substantial objections that can be raised to
letting64 the supply of protection be decided by ordinary political processes. From a prudential point of view, the whole point of a system
of constraints is to mark out areas in which the representative participant will have assurances that certain issues are not settled by ordinary
processes of give-and-take, based on bargaining advantages and
power.
E. The ConstitutionalSupply of Protection
The constitutional approach to protections offers a way to overcome the shortcomings of a legislative/administrative management of

64 Once again, the thrust of Buchanan and Tullock's
argument is that it would be
imprudent for persons to leave this as a matter to be settled "democratically."
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 13, at 74-84. Their argument is that it is rational to
set limits on what can be decided by majoritarian voting procedures. Id. at 72.
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prudential concerns-by providing persons with an assurance that the
issues of protection will be relatively immune from decision-making
processes that are discretionary with regard to both the kinds and the
level of protection offered, and also the class of participants to whom
it will be offered. Such an approach is characteristic of collective decision making at virtually every level of civil society, including clubs, associations, and fraternal organizations, in which cooperative arrangements are employed, and where ordinary issues regarding the way in
which coordination is to be structured are settled in an administrative
or democratic fashion. 5
The appropriateness of a prudential hedge becomes clear,
moreover, when the issue is not how to structure voluntary associations which persons can enter and exit without significant penalties,
but, rather, where persons are understood to be bound by restrictions
not arising from specific consensual acts (such as joining an organization or entering into a contract). These restrictions occur when persons define their basic civil relations to one another. 66 This is the sort
of situation, for example, to which the United Nations Declaration of
67
Human Rights is intended to apply.
Such a constitutional approach is designed to provide people with
a range of public programs and corresponding legal remedies that lie
out of reach of the political agenda of the day. Moreover, and most
importantly, this approach can be designed to apply to all members of
the society, i.e., to provide universal coverage. Whatever the costsaving merits of arranging for the bulk of decisions to be made by
democratic and/or administrative processes, it is still the case that
where substantial issues are at stake-where the costs of an adverse
decision could turn out to be prohibitively high-participants will find
it prudent to insist on something more approximating a rule of una-

65

In particular, this principle is central to the widely utilized Robert's Rules of Order.

HENRY M. ROBERT, ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER (Sarah Corbin Robert et al. eds., 10th

ed. 2000) (1876).
66 As I indicated in the Introduction, a model for this way of addressing prudential
concerns is to be found in BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 13. While they are prepared to defend less-than-unanimity rules for collective choice on the ground of the
savings to be achieved thereby in terms of decision-making and opportunity costs, they
clearly anticipate and incorporate a substantial prudential concern. Id. at 72. That is,
it is central to their argument that it is rational for individuals to agree, in addition, to
a constitution-to the specification of heightened majority rules to apply to certain
classes of policy matters. See id. (noting that an individual will accept "the additional
burden of [supermajority] decision-making in exchange for additional protection
against adverse decisions").
67 G.A. Res. 217A,
supra note 38.
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68

The root idea is not to remove every element of risk from
nimity.
the choices that participants make, but to provide a basic set of protections, available without discrimination to all members of society,
that will allow individuals to then move on and adjust their own activities to whatever their own personal preferences are with respect to
risks. In particular, and most importantly, such protections can provide a consensual basis for the acceptance of the residual kinds of risks
that are inherent in a market-oriented economy.
A constitutional arrangement, of course, does not offer an unconditional guarantee. It remains the case that the constitution itself
can be amended (in accordance with some super-majority rule),
which means that individuals can still be deprived of virtually any type
of protection. But the constitutional approach significantly increases
the likelihood that an individual will be assured a significant range of
protections. Given the usual articulation of distinct and separate legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government, the constitutional approach to protection also has the attractive property that
the power to interpret protective standards will not be vested in officials whose elective status makes them subject to political interest
groups. Under a constitutional system, such interpretive power will
typically be vested in the judicial arm of the government, where there
is arguably a better chance of insulating the interpretive process from
such influences.
F. The Question of the Scope and Level of Protection
I have argued for a constitutional approach to the management of
a wide spectrum of risks. The argument is very general, turning as it
does on the idea that prudence requires a kind of assurance that sim-

68

It should be noted that Buchanan and Tullock explicitly refer to a constitution

that establishes certain basic rights, and they discuss a special, prudentially oriented
calculus that is appropriately applied to actions that "modify or restrict the structure of
individual human or property rights after these have once been defined and generally
accepted by the community." BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 13, at 73. Speaking
to this point, they also argue that
[c]onstitutional prohibitions against many forms of collective intervention in
the market economy have been abolished within the last three decades. As a
result, legislative action may now produce severe capital losses or lucrative
capital gains to separate individuals and groups. For the rational individual,
unable to predict his future position, the imposition of some additional and
renewed restraints on the exercise of such legislative power may be desirable.
Id. at 82. This suggests that they would probably not be prepared to extend this line of
reasoning anywhere near as far as I shall propose in the next Section.
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ply cannot be supplied, at least in modern market-oriented societies,
by social, commercial, and nonconstitutional forms of public governance. But the very generality of this line of reasoning has important
implications for the scope of the argument-for what kinds of protections should be secured by constitutional means. There are a number
of issues related to scope and level of protection, in particular, for
which the argument regarding prudence has important implications.
The first issue of scope concerns whether constitutional restrictions on government action should be confined to the actions of the
central government or whether, given a more complex form of governance, including the assignment of various matters to more local
governance units such as state, city, or township, constitutional restrictions should be imposed on these local units as well. Of the various
kinds of losses against which persons would want some sort of protection, it might seem that those stemming from the actions of the government most plausibly require a constitutional restriction on the
government itself. Concerns about social security, health care, largescale programs that deal with the destructive forces of nature, and the
protection of property, life, and limb, could all, in principle at least,
be supplied by nongovernmental agencies-that is, by social and/or
commercial institutions. In contrast, misuse of government power or
action would seem to be something that could only be handled by a
refinement of government power itself through a restriction on,
rather than an expansion of, governmental activity.69 It is this sort of
problem for which constitutional restrictions on governmental activity-in the form of, say, a "bill of rights"-especially makes sense.
If the rationale for such constitutional restrictions were set out
simply in terms of the need to protect against the centralization of
power, it might be possible to make the case that it is only the actions
of the central government that need to be restricted. However, on the
account I have offered above, the problems that can and should be
addressed by constitutional devices are not just the risks that arise as
the result of the actions of central authorities, but the wide range of
risks posed by actions of other individuals, in either their public or
private capacity, and those due to acts of nature. That is, the argument has been that it is rational for individuals to seek protection
against the arbitrary acts of regional and local officials and delibera69

To be sure, some have argued that a stable democratic order involves more than

just restrictions on government-that it requires the presence of a dense network of
civil and social associations. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM ET AL., MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK
167 (1993) (describing the positive effects of social organizations on collective action).
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tive bodies, the acts of individuals in their private capacity, and acts of
nature, no less
than against the arbitrary acts of agents of the central
7
0
government.
A second and more controversial issue of scope concerns the extension of the constitutional approach to the protections that have
traditionally been associated with a safety net or welfare floor, including access to adequate food, water, clothing, shelter, and facilities for
disposing of bodily wastes; opportunities for exercise and rest; a
minimum level of income or other exchangeable goods; meaningful
work; and adequate legal representation and health care. But here,
no less than in the case of the extension of protection against arbitrary
procedures from central to more local forms of government, it is unclear what basis there could be, from a prudential perspective, for the
traditional emphasis in the American experience simply on the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights. It is clearly prudent to insist on
freedom of association, religion, and the press, as well as protection
from arbitrary searches and seizures. But it is equally prudent to insist
on basic safety nets, educational rights, and rights to legal and medical
assistance. The issue here is neatly captured in the striking difference
between the U.S. Bill of Rights and the U.N. Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.7 The former is overwhelmingly preoccupied with
procedural, association, and opportunity rights, while the latter,
though including all of these, extends to include a variety of "positive"
rights of a kind associated with the concept of a basic social minimum.
The difference between the two approaches is profound. The
first, on its original construction, offered persons the assurance that
they would have protection against the actions of officials of the new
central government. Later, these protections were extended to the
actions of state and local governments. But on either construction,
the Bill of Rights's provisions are limited to providing protection
against certain coercive acts of public officials. The U.N. Declaration
offers all of the protections of the Bill of Rights, but extends the concept of human rights to cover a very wide range of additional concerns. In particular, and in sharp contrast to the Bill of Rights's provisions, it offers the individual assurance against being placed in a

70 There is, to be sure, an important difference between the controls exercised
by
the most general political unit to which the individual belongs, and those exercised by
all other, more localized units. If freedom of movement is assured, one natural check
on local repression will come in the form of the persons who are subjected to such repression voting with their feet, that is, by exiting the local unit in question.
71 G.A. Res. 217A, supra note 38.
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position in which, because of the vicissitudes of natural events and the
unintentional actions of other persons, the individual has to choose
between the lesser of two great evils. 72 The reality of social and commercial interactions is that they can work out in a manner that deeply
compromises the interests of some participants (without anyone intending this). A system based on no more than the kinds of guarantees embodied in the U.S. Constitution offers persons very limited
protection. Specifically, there is no assurance that actions of others
and/or natural events will not severely erode one's own position and
one's own ability to provide the basic necessities for oneself and one's
loved ones. In contrast, the incorporation of certain basic welfare
rights means that citizens are provided with a secure initial position
from which they are free to voluntarily enter into a wide range of social and commercial alliances-but only on terms that do not involve
forced choices, in which certain needs will have to be sacrificed in order to meet others.
With regard to the issue of the level of protection it is appropriate
to secure, the following considerations can be offered in support of a
higher rather than a lower level of protection. First, when the level of
security is set lower rather than higher, some will simply have to live
with less security than they either need or desire. Only some will be
faced with this problem, of course, because others-those who are
better off financially, and who are also risk averse-can supplement
public protections with commercially provided protections. But, as
already noted, that simply increases the unevenness of the protections
that each is able to secure. By way of contrast, if the concerns of the
more risk adverse are publicly met, some, to be sure, will find themselves with more protection than they desire. But the two situations
are not symmetrical. Those who are provided with greater security
than they desire will typically not have a complaint regarding the level
of protection provided, although they may, of course, complain about
the cost of the unwanted protection. This is because there are ways in
which the more risk oriented can still indulge their interest in living in
a more risky manner. The more risk oriented can simply choose not
to exercise their "right" to a higher level of protection (e.g., they can
72

Hobbes argues in Leviathan: "Fear and liberty are consistent, as when a man

throweth his goods into the sea for fear the ship should sink, he doth it nevertheless
very willingly, and may refuse to do it if he will." HOBBES, supra note 1, at ch. xxi, para.
3. But this does not in the least undercut the point that it is not prudent to put oneself
in a situation in which one's only options are to lose one's goods or one's ship (or
perhaps, more accurately, one's life)-that is, to have to choose between such important primary goods. In ordinary parlance, we would speak of this as a forced choice.
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refuse social security or unemployment benefits). Alternatively, and
in response to the issue of financial burden, those who desire less security can be offered monetary compensation in return for giving up
their right to protection. In effect, they can be offered venture capital
shares in exchange for security shares.
Second, there is empirical evidence, in the form of revealed preferences, that the general level of affluence achieved in any given society is relevant to what individuals are prepared to demand in the way
of protection. The increasing affluence that well-organized economic
activity produces has been associated historically with increasing concern for security. Moreover, there is evidence that persons tend to
demand a higher level of security or protection in situations where
they have no (or little) control over the risks to which they are exposed-i.e., when there is little they can personally do to control the
risks.73 This suggests that in a modem, economically advanced society,
characterized by extensive and complex forms of cooperation that
generate risks over which individuals have little power of control, one
can expect that higher levels of protection will be acceptable to participants.
Third, it must be acknowledged that responding to the prudential
concerns of participants involves the expenditure of scarce resources.
Real protections are not costless. 4 The question of an appropriate
level of protections cannot be settled except within the context of a
comprehensive theory of public policy based on a clear understanding
of the kinds of trade-offs that are involved, and how scarce resources
are to be allocated. There is one cost in particular that must be carefully factored into the analysis. There are whole ranges of activities
where the provision of protection raises the problem of what economists term "moral hazard." The problem is that a high level of protection can leave persons insufficiently motivated to take due care, so
that the probability of certain adverse events can increase as a result of
providing such protection. 75 For instance, if one could fully ensure

73 See Chauncey Starr, Social Benefit Versus
TechnologicalRisk: What Is Our Society Willing to Pay.for Safety?, 165 SCIENCE (n.s.) 1232, 1233-34, 1237 (1969) (defining "involuntary" activities as activities that are out of one's control and concluding that quantitative methodology suggests that people are "willing to accept 'voluntary' risks roughly
1000 times greater than 'involuntary' risks").
74 For a discussion of this theme, see STEPHEN
HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE

CosT OF RIGhITs (1999).
75 See, e.g., KennethJ. Arrow, Uncertainty and
the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53
AM. ECON. REv. 941, 961 (1963) ("One of the limits which has been much stressed in
insurance literature is the effect of insurance on incentives.").
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one's goods without any deductible, one would have less reason to
take care that the goods are not stolen. Having said that, it must be
observed that abstract theory proves a very poor second to solid empirical data when it comes to trying to determine just how serious the
problem of moral hazard is in connection with a wide variety of protective programs.""
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR A THEORY OF RIGHTS

So far, I have simply sought to explore what sort of a case can be
made for this or that alternative method for meeting certain prudential concerns. The preceding discussion points, however, to a distinct
way in which one could think about what is a most important topic,
namely, the place of certain principles of rights in a theory of rational
political and social institutions. In the philosophical literature, there
are two distinct issues that have preoccupied theorists: The first is
what grounds there are for according persons various rights. The second is whether and to what extent rights claims "trump" other kinds
of policy considerations.
With respect to the first of these issues, one familiar way of
grounding certain rights claims is by appealing to the idea of people
engaging in a joint enterprise, in which there is mutual submission to
restrictions on the liberties of those involved, for the sake of mutual
advantages. The assumption is that persons are willing to submit to
certain restrictions in return for the benefits that flow from the arrangement, and that, typically, the benefits to any one participant are
significantly conditioned by others restricting their actions. In this
kind of a setting, it is customary to think that those who benefit from
others submitting to such restrictions have a duty to do their part as
well, and that those who have submitted have a right to submission by
those who have so benefited. One can call this the principle of mutuality of restrictions.77 On such a view, rights arise within the context of
76 One very recent relevant study is GOODIN ET AL.,
supra note 45, which offers
substantial empirical evidence against the commonplace model-theoretic claims regarding the disincentive effects of extensive welfare programs.
H.L.A. Hart characterizes such a regulative principle in the following
way:

"[W] hen a number of persons conduct anyjoint enterprise according to rules and thus
restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required
have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by their submission." H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 185 (1955). Hart
resists classifying together the rights that arise from promises and consent ("authorization") and the rights that arise from mutual restrictions, but he is prepared to acknowledge that all of these "arise from previous voluntary actions." Id. Rawls slightly

952

UNIVERSITY OF PEANSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 151: 917

cooperative arrangements among persons. For the moment, we need
not settle the question of whether such arrangements are best understood on the model of voluntary, consensual acts (the contractual account) or emerge somewhat more indirectly, as a matter of evolving
customs or traditions (the convention account). It will prove useful,
however, to explore some of the features of such an account.
First, one defines a reference point by imagining a situation in
which there are no restrictions on the actions of individuals. This
would be a state of maximum freedom or liberty. Viewed from that
standpoint, every arrangement entered into with others constitutes an
exchange of freedom for benefits. Of course, in many cases, the exchange
involves giving up certain freedoms in order to secure freedom from
interference by others. But it may also be an exchange of freedom for
other kinds of benefits-such as a safety net with regard to basic
needs, or increased income." There is, in this way of thinking, no assumption that any person has a natural right toS, noninterference
from
79
others, or even a natural right to nondomination. On this account,
80
the natural order is a "free-for-all" in which anything is permissible.

rephrases the principle and refers to it as the principle of fairness. See RAWLS, supra
note 15, at 111-12 ("This principle [of fairness] holds a person is required to do his
part... when two conditions are met: first, the institution is just (or fair) ... and second, one has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken advantage
of the opportunities it offers to further one's interests.").
78 It should be noted that Hart argues,
to the contrary, that
it is ... a very important feature of a moral right that the possessor of it is
conceived as having a moral justification for limiting the freedom of another
and that he has this justification not because the action he is entitled to require of another has some moral quality but simply because in the circumstances a certain distribution of human freedom will be maintained if he by his
choice is allowed to determine how that other shall act.
Hart, supra note 77, at 178 (emphasis added). One can bring this formulation in line
with the account I have been developing, however, by dropping the reference to
"moral," and making clear that it is not just the distribution of freedom, but, more
generally, distribution of benefits that is relevant here. Modified in this fashion, the
claim would now be that it is a very important feature of a right that the possessor of it
is conceived as having a justification for limiting the freedom of another and that she
has this justification not because the action she is entitled to require of another has
some quality but simply because, in the circumstances, a fair distribution of benefits will
be maintained if she, by her choice, is allowed to determine how that other shall act.
79 This way of thinking is to be distinguished, of course, from
that found in Hart,
who postulates a natural right to certain kinds of noninterference. See id. at 175
("[T]he equal right of all men to be free [is] a naturalright."). It is also different from
the view taken by Pettit, for whom there is a natural right to nondomination. PETTIT,
supra note 52, at 10.
80 This is, of course, the conceptual starting
point in Leviathan-the state of a war
of all against all. See HOBBES, supra note 1, at ch. xiii, para. 8 ("[D] tiring the time men
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The presumption against interference, when such interference is not
for the sake of securing freedom from coercion, restraint, and injurious actions of others, is not an antecedent feature of the natural order. Rather, it is established by entering into arrangements with others. And such a principle of noninterference is only one of the things
that a rational person will seek to have included in arrangements with
others.
A. Rights and Mutual Benefits
On the account just sketched, it makes no sense to suppose that
persons would accept certain restrictions on their actions except in return for some benefit. That is, individuals are presumed to be motivated to accept responsibilities out of consideration of the benefits to
be derived thereby. In this sense, it is not really mutuality of restrictions, but mutuality of benefits that characterizes the kind of arrangement that gives rise to rights and duties.

live [in the state of nature] ... [they live] in that condition which is called war; and
such a war as is of every man against every man.").
81 In particular, one can imagine arrangements (typically involving a complex division of labor) under which the coordination of activities is mutual in the formal sense
only. That is, while each participant is subject to restrictions, these vary significantly
from one participant to another. Still the coordination scheme gives rise to rights and
duties by virtue of the gains to each that can be realized thereby. What happens, on
this reformulation, to Hart's notion of there being a basic natural right to be free?
Hart argues that
in the absence of certain special conditions which are consistent with the right
being an equal right, any adult human being capable of choice (1) has the
right to forbearance on the part of all others from the use of coercion or restraint against him save to hinder coercion or restraint and (2) is at liberty to
do (i.e., is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one
coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons.
Hart, supra note 77, at 175. This principle stands in uneasy tension to what Hart later
endorses in the same article and characterizes as the mutuality of restrictions principle.
Id. at 177-83. That latter principle, I have already suggested, makes it appropriate to
limit the freedom of one person who benefits from limits others have placed on their
freedom, for the sake of mutual advantages, but who refuses to accept similar restrictions. What I am proposing here, essentially, is a shift of emphasis from Hart's "natural
fight" of all men to be free to his mutuality of restrictions principle. The latter, I want
to suggest, is the more fundamental. The problem is that the former, while it is certainly endorsed by many modern liberal societies, speaks, in effect, only to one kind of
social concern. Individuals enter into arrangements with one another not just to secure freedom from interference, but for other reasons as well, such as for protection
against hostile nature, to better serve basic needs, and, more generally, what Hobbes
refers to as "commodious living." HOBBES, supra note 1, at ch. xiii, para. 14. In making this shift I am, of course, supposing that what Hart terms (one class of) "special"
rights, which he, in fact, takes as the foundation of political rights and obligations, are

954

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 151: 917

Does it suffice for the grounding of rights and obligations, in such
cases, that all gain, or is there some further requirement on the distribution of the benefits that such an arrangement makes possible? Mutuality of gain can exist under what are very forced arrangements between persons that provide some with large gains while others have to
make do with only the most marginal of benefits. 2 The view sketched
above presumes that an arrangement generating rights and duties
does not distribute benefits so that some are net gainers while others
are net losers. But it is also open to us to insist on more than this.
Suppose that some gain much more and others much less, and that
the distribution is not one that could be the object of an informed
consensus between participants. It can be argued that such a distribution of benefits is not rationally acceptable, and that this is highly
relevant to the question of whether any such arrangement generates
rights and obligations. Roughly speaking, the idea would be that only
an arrangement in which benefits are fairly distributed could give rise
to rights and duties..s
B. Rights and Prudence
When coordination is to take place over time, and against the
backdrop of future events whose occurrence can at best be estimated,
the judgment of advantage will characteristically be a judgment of expected advantage. But that means that there is, unavoidably, an issue of
risk that arises in connection with virtually any arrangement. What
generates great benefits for all under certain conditions can deeply
disadvantage some under other conditions. The representative person, I have suggested, will not be willing to acceptjust any such possible loss, just so long as there is a net positive expected return. It is
precisely here that considerations of prudence play an important role
in the justification of arrangements between persons. The argument
of the preceding Sections is that considerations of prudence, in respect to risks involving one's access to various primary goods, give rise
the real basis for any set of rights. See Hart, supra note 77, at 183-85 (defining "special"
rights as those which "arise out of special transactions between individuals or out of
some82special relationship in. which they
stand to each other").
.
Of course, not all inequalities presuppose forced relations between persons.
Following Rawls, we may suppose that some inequalities can be fully accepted by persons on the ground that they work out to the mutual advantage of all. RAWLS, supra
note 15, at 87.
That rights and duties are conditioned by the fairness of the practices within
which they are articulated is a theme that is common to both DAVID GAUTHIER,
MORALS BYAGREEMENT 1-20 (1986), and RAWLS, supra note 15, at 93-98.
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to a distinct set of rights, particularly in situations in which one is involuntarily exposed to risk.
The risks that a prudent person will seek to reduce are of one of
two kinds. Either the policy in question directly exposes the person to
an unacceptable risk, or while what it exposes the person to would be,
in and of itself, an acceptable risk, it establishes a precedent that the
person judges to be unacceptable. That is, the policy opens the door
to future decisions some of which would (or could) yield unacceptable consequences for the person in question.
To illustrate the second case, suppose public policy considerations
are introduced that require for their implementation only the most
marginal of violations of something to which some group of persons
thinks they have aright. For example, suppose great public benefits
would flow from marginally restricting the movements of a small class
of persons. Even granting the importance of freedom of movement,
one could imagine that those whose freedom of movement is restricted still benefit in other ways from the restriction, so that the arrangement yields some mutual benefits. Suppose, for instance, that
the U.S. government, in pursuit of homeland security, were to ban all
those of near-eastern origin (including U.S. citizens) from traveling
closer than ten miles to any military installation or nuclear power
plant. Even those banned from such travel could be said to benefit
from the enhanced security.
In such a case, however, society has to contend with the precedent
that this might set. The significance of "slippery slope" arguments becomes clearer when one looks at them from a prudential perspective.
Prudence involves seeking to avoid or protect oneself against the occurrence of certain disastrous outcomes. A precedent serves to remind one of a possible disastrous outcome to a decision process, an
outcome to which the precedent is thought to open the door or render more probable. 4
84 Is anything gained by thinking about these situations
as involving the potential
loss of primary, as distinct from important, intrinsic goods? Looking back at our original list, freedom of religion and the right to a nationality in particular speak to something that many think of as having deep, intrinsic value. We can grant that many do
think of them this way, but still insist that they have great instrumental value as well. It
is important to recognize, however, that what is at issue here is not just the securing for
oneself of certain rights, for example, freedom to practice one's own religion and
make one's own nationality identification. The principle to which persons are to
commit themselves is that each individual is to have these freedoms. We may suppose,
then, that for each person her own religious freedom-and her own nationality-is
something of intrinsic value. But the granting of these same freedoms to others (of a
different religion and a different nationality) is not necessarily intrinsically valuable for
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C. Do Rights Trump Classical UtilitarianConsiderations?
Let me now take up the other question posed at the outset of Part
VI. What I have just suggested is that rights can be grounded in certain cases in consideration of what counts as a fair distribution of mutual benefits in general, and in other cases in prudential considerations. In either case, the idea that they can trump ordinary utilitarian
considerations of greater aggregate gain is implicit in the whole of the
foregoing analysis.
Note, first of all, that a rational but prudent person would be disposed, prima facie, to insist that policy decisions should not just produce the greatest aggregate benefits (or utility), but should produce
benefits for each participant, since only then can one be sure that one
will not be disadvantaged by some policy that is adopted. That is,
within the framework I have developed, that a given policy would produce the greatest aggregate utility provides no ground, in and of itself,
for the rational acceptance of that policy, since acceptance depends
upon expected gains to oneself, and it is possible that the policy that
produces the greatest aggregate utility does so at the expense of one's
own advantage (or utility).
But it is also plausible to suppose that under certain conditions
one would agree to the use of a utilitarian aggregation rule. Insofar as
one desires to see one's interests promoted, one may find it to one's
advantage to support the operation of a rule that requires the maximization of the sum of gains (utilities). This will be the case if one
judges that the operation of such a rule over time will result in net
benefits to oneself. That is, the operation of the rule may impose
costs upon oneself in some cases, but one still expects to realize a net
gain over the long run.s5
To the extent that any such defense of a utilitarian rule for policy
decisions could be constructed, however, it would be subject to precisely the same qualifications expressed in the idea of constitutional

the representative person. It may be viewed as only valuable as a means to one's own
end, such as being able to practice one's own religion and nationality.
8 The argument sketched here is one that can be adapted
from the analysis that
Buchanan and Tullock offer, of conditions under which rational persons would be willing to agree to a majoritarian principle of voting. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra
note 13, at 63-84 (employing economic theory to help explain when a reasonable person would accept a majoritarian scheme of voting). Here, no less than in the case of
the operation of majoritarian rules, one can expect that there will be significant decision-making and opportunity costs to operating under the more stringent rule that requires everyone to actually gain as a result of each decision reached.
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restrictions on the majoritarian voting principle. That is, for a rational person with prudential concerns, a positive net expected gain
would hardly be decisive. The representative individual will still want
constitutional constraints that would, at least in some situations,
trump considerations of expected gain. Once again, the logic of a
prudential concern is such that it cannot be set to one side merely by
showing that, for the individual in question, the expected gain is sufficiently large as to outweigh the expected risk, in other words, the loss
discounted by its probability.""
We may suppose, then, that given prudential concerns, it is rational for individuals to agree to a constitution, to the specification of
different decision-making rules for different classes of policy matters.
Rational but prudent individuals may well be willing to support the
operation of a utilitarian aggregation rule, but they will also find it
prudent to exempt certain classes of policy decisions from such a calculus. That is, they will regard the rule as appropriate for certain policy issues, and not for others. Roughly speaking, one could expect
that some version of a utilitarian aggregation rule will be selected as
the appropriate rule for middle-level decision making, in which fundamental rights are not at issue in any substantial way, and where one
expects a sufficiently large number of more or less similar issues to be
settled by the use of the rule. This is particularly true in cases where
one's own position is likely to be more or less randomly distributed,
and hence where one can at least expect, over the long run, that
things will balance out to one's own net advantage. On this way of
thinking, the utilitarian aggregation principle has a role to play in a
comprehensive approach to public policy, but the range of situations
in which it would be rational to employ the principle will be significantly limited, and the limiting considerations will be expressed in
terms of a set of constitutionally established basic rights. For this reas6 This is a point, I hasten to remind the reader, that even those persuaded by the
theory of expected utility (articulated in terms of either "objective" or "subjective"
probabilities) can accept. The more specific issue now under consideration, concerning whether rights trump utilitarian considerations, is raised and extensively discussed
by Ronald Dworkin. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977)
(offering a theory of rights that allows the society to reap the benefits of a political
democracy that enforces utilitarianism, while at the same time protecting fundamental
rights of its citizens). Dworkin's own account, however, I find less than satisfactory,
and this for reasons similar to those that I raised in connection with Nozick's account
of rights. See supra note 50 (criticizing Nozick's take on the theory of natural rights).
Dworkin presses upon us the claim that rights are trumps, but he offers little by way of
argument for this relationship between rights and utilitarian considerations: it is simply presented to the reader as capturing our (his?) intuitions on the subject.
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son, it can hardly be taken, as many philosophers and even some
economists have thought, as the fundamental principle for shaping social, political, and economic policies."
D. The Negative/PositiveDistinction
Much has been written about the significance of a particular distinction that can be drawn between two basic ways in which to deal
with the risks to which individuals are exposed. This is the distinction
between having persons simply refrain from acting in various ways, for
example trespassing on the "territory" of others (however that is defined), and positively coordinating or cooperating with each other.
Thus, for instance, protection from certain kinds of threats to personal bodily integrity-specifically, threats from other members of
one's own society-can be achieved by simply having everyone constrain their own actions in various ways, by avoiding crossing the
boundaries that are established between persons."" What are marked
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The last few decades have witnessed two extraordinarily articulate and equally

thoughtful presentations of the case against the conception of an unlimited scope for a
utilitarian principle: one set forth by Ronald Dworkin and the other by John Rawls.
DWORKIN, supra note 86; RAWLS, supra note 15. To be sure, as many have read the debate that followed the publication of Rawls's work, there is something inconclusive
about the argument from behind the veil of ignorance. And, again, while Dworkin's
brief for a theory of rights that sets constraints on the operation of a utilitarian principle is powerfully advocated, still his own argument, as I have already suggested, supra
note 12, makes altogether too much of an appeal to intuition. The line of reasoning I
have pursued here, which is adapted from Buchanan and Tullock's argument in The
Calculus of Consent, for a constitutional structure, offers a more secure route to the
conclusion embraced by both Dworkin and Rawls. That is, it provides a ground for
Dworkin's intuitions about rights by appeal to a theory of rational, prudential choice;
and it offers a way to reconstruct Rawls's argument from behind the veil of ignorance
so that, leaving to one side the question of whether it yields Rawls's own theory of justice, it still serves to effectively underline what he finds so worrisome about the utilitarian principle. For a more extended discussion of the shaky grounds on which the utilitarian principle is usually defended, see Edward F. McClennen, Utility and
Utilitarianism, in VALUES, JUSTICE AND ECONOMICS (Gerald F. Gaus et al. eds., forth-
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The theme of mutual disengagement is central to Hobbes's classical analysis of
what it means to lay down a right.
To lay down a man's right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the same. For he that renounceth or passeth away his right giveth not to any other man a right which
he had not before, because there is nothing to which every man had not right
by nature, but only standeth out of his way that he may enjoy his own original
right without hinderance from him, not without hinderance from another.
So that the effect which redoundeth to one man by another man's defect of
88
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in this way are what have come to be known as "negative" rights. By
way of contrast, very little can be accomplished by way of protecting
persons against acts of nature, except by concerted and elaborate coordination of efforts (i.e., to build dikes or dams, or to compensate by
concerted public or private philanthropic effort). Similarly, safety
nets cannot be provided by acts of omission, but only by an elaborate
scheme involving what amounts to a redistribution of goods.
The negative/positive distinction is intelligible enough, but it is
often introduced in the context of an impassioned defense, in terms
of public arrangements, of "negative" rights (rights to noninterference) and rejection of "positive" rights (such as a right to a social
minimum).
In the first place, securing the members of a society
from external aggression requires a huge "positive" coordination of
effort. And even if internal order could be achieved, in principle, by
each simply refraining from certain actions, still the maintenance of
internal order-the assuring that others within one's own society will
respect one's rights-requires a significant positive coordination of
effort (by law enforcement officers).90
To treat "negative" rights as having some special status that does
not extend to "positive" rights also has the effect of elevating the
harms done by other people to a special status. But whatever level of
security one desires with regard to losses that would impact on one's
future ability to fulfill one's desires, there is no reason why one would
want to have security with respect to aggressive actions of persons, but
have no interest, or less interest, say, in protecting against losses deriving from acts of nature or the negative externalities generated by the
social and economic actions of other individuals or groups. In very
general terms, it cannot be the source of the risk, nor the nature of
the activity required to reduce the risk, that determines whether the
risk is one about which it is rational for persons to be prudentially
concerned.

right is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own right
original.
HOBBES, supra note 1, at ch. xiv, para. 6.
89 For a general discussion of the distinction between
"negative" and "positive"
rights, see HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY 35-64 (1980).
9o To this, see the discussion in HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 74, at
37-43.
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CONCLUSION: SECURITY AND MUTUAL ADVANTAGE

I have argued here that prudential concerns cannot be met by a
system in which the level of protection is determined by political giveand-take. What inferences can we draw from this regarding societies
in which this is the way that these matters are resolved? One obvious
point here is that bargains regarding protection are not, in general,
bargains over how high the level of protection will be set. They are
typically also bargains that affect the distribution of protection as well.
Those who are well off are able to secure in the marketplace the level
of protection they desire, while those who are not well off have to settle for less. The question of prudence, then, inevitably becomes one
of distribution. Insofar as matters are left to the usual political processes, the result will be that some are able to secure the protections
they desire and others are not.
For the moment, I shall content myself with some closing comments about the more direct implications of a failure to address the
prudential concerns of all members of society. Mutually beneficial
cooperation can be seriously undercut by concern on the part of some
participants that they lack an adequate assurance that their substantial
prudential concerns will be respected. Without such an assurance,
individuals will be disposed to seek less inclusive forms of association
that will enable them to look out for themselves and others whom they
care about and who are in the same predicament. This is likely to
have three significant consequences: The first is that there are real
economic opportunity costs involved in less inclusive forms of association and commercial exchange. The second is that there is likely to
be an increase in social and economic conflict, and this will also have
implications for how successfully the members of such a society can
secure the gains that can come from effective cooperation. The third
is that the failure to meet the prudential concerns of participants
poses a special problem for any society that hopes to create a culture
that can reap the benefits that come from respect for rules.9 ' Rational
individuals whose prudential concerns are not met by the basic structure of society can hardly be supposed to have as strong a commitment to act in a principled fashion. They will see their relations to

91 For a discussion of the importance of our attitudes towards rules, see Edward F.
McClennen, 7he Strategy of Cooperation, in PRACTICAL RATIONALITY AND PREFERENCE:
ESSAYS FOR DAVID GAUTHIER 189 (Christopher W. Morris & Arthur Ripstein eds.,
2001).
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others shaped, not by mutually accepted principles, but by the distribution of force and power in society. Conformity to the rules defining
the society will have to be secured, then, not by a mutual acceptance
of shared rights and obligations, but by elaborate surveillance and enforcement mechanisms. And on any credible account, these mechanisms involve high costs that will have to be borne by the participants
themselves.
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